Polarity items (PIs) license the ellipsis of their non-polarity counterparts and vice versa: if ellipsis is subject to a syntactic identity constraint, then we must conclude that pairs like some any are syntactically identical in the relevant sense. One technical way of cashing this out is given, and further consequences are discussed.
Overview and analysis in brief
The nature of polarity items has long been a topic of interest, because of the conditions on their limited distribution. This long note attempts to bring some conclusions from recent work on ellipsis to bear on the question of the nature of polarity items, concluding that polarity items in some instances should be analyzed as particular structure-dependent realizations of their non-polarity sensitive brethren. The argument is structured around a conditional: if the identity condition on ellipsis is defined (at least partially) over syntactic structures, then polarity items must be syntactically identical (in the relevant representation) to certain indefinites. In other words, a syntactic view of elliptical identity seems to require that we posit that some polarity items appear as such merely by virtue of their position and relations to licensors.
I begin by reviewing some of the evidence in the recent literature bearing on the nature of the relation between the elided material-which is argued to be syntactically present though unpronounced-and its antecedent; if some recent proposals are correct, then at least part of this relation is one of syntactic identity. This proposition forms the protasis of the conditional of this paper. Whether or not the protasis is actually true is a separate question, one addressed in the literature I cite, but it is not a question I will take up here.
The remainder of the paper explores the consequences of this conclusion in the domain of polarity items such as (1) and (2) (from Sag 1976:157f., also discussed in Bresnan 1971 , Ladusaw 1979 , Hardt 1993 , Fiengo and May 1994 , Giannakidou 1998 , and Johnson 2001 .
(1) John didn't see anyone, but Mary did.
(2) John saw someone, but Mary didn't.
Briefly, I propose, following the spirit of Giannakidou 2000 , Giannakidou 2007 , that polarity items have a syntactic feature [Pol:_] which is valued under Agree with a c-commanding 'licensor' such as negation.
1 Generalizing, certain expressions have varying morphological realizations, depending on their syntactic environment. Which morphology is realized is determined by agreement with a valuer. The analysis is represented in (3), assuming the morphological spell-out rules in (4) (with a uniform semantics as in (4c)): From this analysis, I argue that syntactic identity conditions on ellipsis are compatible only with a refined view of polarity items.
Naturally, this proposal is programmatic in many respects, and a number of very important issues and consequences can be little more than touched upon here; it is my hope that these might be addressed in future work.
2 Protasis: Why one might believe in some syntactic identity
There is a substantial literature on the nature of the identity conditions on elliptical structures which shows that there are semantic constraints on ellipsis; there is also some indications that such conditions may be supplemented in some circumstances with an identity condition stated over syntactic representations. (6) VP-ellipsis a. The janitor must remove the trash whenever it is apparent that it should be. <removed> b. The system can be used by anyone who wants to. <use it> Previous analyses of the uneven distribution of voice mismatch posit that voice morphology which is expressed on the verb is determined by a functional head, Voice, which is external to the VP (Kratzer 1996, Harley 2006 and others; see Rooryck 1997 for important caveats):
(7) a. Someone murdered Joe.
2 See also Sag 1976 , Hankamer and Sag 1976 , Dalrymple et al. 1991 , Hardt 1993 , Fiengo and May 1994 , Johnson 2001 , Kehler 2002 , Arregui et al. 2006 , Baker 2007 , Merchant 2008 , Kim et al. 2011 The core idea is that whenever we find an apparent mismatch, the trigger is outside the ellipsis site, while the goal is inside. This parallels an argument made on the basis of the distribution of English be under ellispis by Lasnik 1995 (see also Warner 1985 , Potsdam 1997 , Lightfoot 2000 , Nunes and Zocca 2005 and McCloskey 1991 and Goldberg 2005 for related points): in general, English verbs (both regular and irregular) don't require morphological identity:
(11) a. Emily played beautifully at the recital and her sister will, too. <play beautifully at the recital> b. Emily took a break from her studies, and her sister will, too. <take a break from her studies> c. Emily sang the song {because|the way} she wanted to. <sing the song> Exceptionally, however, forms of be do require morphological identity:
(12) a. Emily will be (beautiful) at the recital, and her sister will, too. <be (beautiful) at the recital> b. *Emily was beautiful at the recital and her sister will, too. c. Emily will be elected to Congress just like her sister was. d. *Emily was elected to Congress {because|just like} she really wanted to.
Lasnik's analysis is that forms of be are inserted fully inflected, while other verbs get their inflection in the course of the derivation (see also Depiante and Hankamer 2008 for an extension of this logic). Such an analysis does seem to make very plausible that elliptical identity is between syntactic phrase markers, at least in these cases.
Phrase marker identity provides an approach to following apparent category mismatches documented in Hardt 1993 as well: (13) Fu et al. 2001 , analyzes these examples as involving deverbal nouns, and supposes that these nouns in fact contain a VP at some level of representation, making this VP the antecedent for the VP-ellipsis. These authors point out that VP-ellipsis whose putative antecedent contains no deverbal nominal is much worse. In other words, positing a VP inside agent nominalizations iner allows us to make sense of the following contrast, in which (14a) is markedly more acceptable than (14b) ((14a) has the same status as (13a)): (14) a. That man is a robber, and when he does, he tries not to make any noise. b. *That man is a thief, and when he does, he tries not to make any noise.
Purely semantic approaches to elliptical identity would have difficulty distinguishing these, as the relevant lexical entailments (from be a robber to rob someone and from be a thief to steal something) are equivalent in the two cases. The important difference is not in the semantics of the nominals robber and thief but in their lexical composition: robber is an agentive nominal derived from rob + -er, while thief has no embedded VP headed by steal. Imagine, then, that ellipses are subject to a condition that states that the missing (elided) material is syntactically and semantically identical to some antecedent (a detailed formulation and examples are given in the appendix). This leads us immediately to the set of data that Sag 1976:157f. considered, repeated here. As Sag (and Bresnan 1971 before him) noted, the elided VP in (15) seems to be equivalent to (15a), not to the surface-identical (15b) (which is ungrammatical, violating the conditions on polarity items); in any case, the meaning of the clause containing the ellipsis can be represented by (15c). Under a strict phrase marker identity requirement on ellipsis (see appendix for a formalization), we can confront the problem posed by the apparent mismatches above as we did for inflectional feature variance, by following Giannakidou 2000 , Giannakidou 2007 in supposing that polarity items have a syntactic feature Pol:_ which is valued under Agree with a c-commanding 'licensor' such as negation. (See also Klima 1964 , Zeijlstra 2008 , Haegeman and Lohndal 2010 , and Penka 2011 This approach assimilates, counter surface appearances, polarity items to other items that vary in their appearance: certain expressions have varying morphological realizations, depending on their syntactic environment. Which morphology is realized is determined by agreement with a valuer; the allomorph is determined by the nature of the valuer. In particular, this approach is inspired by the ideas in Giannakidou and Merchant 2002 , where it is proposed that some quantificational determiners may be high in the tree (specifically, that a Q head high in the tree could serve as a scope-marker whose value was determined by Agree with an in situ DP; see Sportiche 2005 for a similar approach). Here, I turn this idea around: the (higher) scope marker starts out with the Q-force determined, and values the lower determiner, which provides the restriction (with quantification over choice functions).
In detail, we need to posit phrase markers like the following (to satisfy the identity requirement 5 ), interacting with morphological realization rules as those given in (19). The conditions for deep anaphors like do it and for other surface anaphors like do so (see Sag 1976 and Sag and Hankamer 1984) differ slightly: both require some antecedent, but their conditions are clearly semantic. Both seem to allow polarity items in antecedents, with a positive reading, though further investigation will have to await a different occasion.
6 As a reviewer notes, this commits us-at least for pairs of sentences in which ellipsis licensing of this kind is at stake-to a symmetricalist view of positive and negative sentences (see Ladusaw 1996) . Such a view, if necessarily uniform across all sentences, has been well criticized by Horn 1989. 
Such lexical insertion rules will take the feature bundles assembled by the syntax and map them to their appropriate morphological realizations. 7 In essence, this approach, though updated, follows Klima 1964 in spirit (as do other recent instantiations of Distributed Morphology applied to the polarity domain, such as those mentioned above). Klima 1964:280 gave the following rules: the feature conflation transformations did the job of our Agree, while his morphological spell out rules were equivalent to ours (see below for more on the determiner no).
(20) Feature conflation transformations a. Indef -incorporation:
Like Klima, we must then extend this analysis to other polarity item/nonpolarity item pairs, such as those discussed in Ladusaw 1979, etc.: ever ∼ (at least) once, yet ∼ already (and, for some speakers, until ∼ before, according to Sag 1976:158-160 , and at all ∼ somewhat, from Klima 1964:282) .
There are possibilities, of course, for implementing this kind of a solution without positing this kind of alternative spell-out of identical items under inflectional agreement with a higher head. The main two simply turn the analysis on its head, in terms of ordering of the operations in a derivational framework: the first would suppose that the polarity item (or at least the polarity-sensitive part) is scoped out at some abstract level of representation (say, LF), and that the postscoping phrase markers are what are compared for purposes of the elliptical identity condition (where what remains gets interpreted for example under existential closure or as a choice function variable), as in Abels and Martí 2010. The other possible implementation along these lines is to claim that the polarity-sensitive determiner combines with the restriction outside the ellipsis site, as in Sportiche 2005. While these differing conceptions of the mechanisms are important, I do not see that the current data help us to distinguish among them, and so I will not attempt a comparison here.
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The present proposal shares with these other analyses the basic idea that determiners' looks are deceiving, and that it is not feasible to capture the full range of data by using only the surface morphology and consituency as guidelines (despite some successes in these directions, such as Jacobson 1992 and Swart and Sag 2002) . One may justly be tempted to discount this conclusion from the behavior of polarity items under ellipsis as being due not to an intricate morphosyntax of determiners, but rather due to some other property of ellipsis. In the remainder of this paper, I review a range of data from other determiners that make it more plausible that this pattern is not due simply to a yet to be specified set of constraints on ellipsis, but rather is indicative of a more complex understanding of determiners.
Some other determiners under ellipsis
Some of the most persuasive complicating evidence comes from the behavior of ellipsis when the antecedent contains a DP apparently headed by the determiner no. This determiner, when inside the VP, has a strange property: it licenses VPellipsis where the elided VP has no 'negative' meaning at all, as in the following examples: The solution to this is to believe that no decomposes into a negation (which takes scope outside the VP) and an indefinite, interpreted as an existential (which may take scope inside the VP), as suggested for precisely these ellipsis cases by Johnson 2001 . This is the path of analysis followed by many researchers, of course, for similar facts from scope found with German kein and Dutch geen (see Jacobs 1980 for the original proposal, and Giannakidou 2000 , Potts 2000 , and Abels and Martí 2010 for more recent discussion, and Geurts 1996 for a contrary view). As these authors note, kein Auto and no employees can give rise to split readings (in addition to taking unitary scope above or below the universal subject or modal): 
A usual analysis of this is to claim that in these cases, kein/geen/no is an existential (or choice function variable) that takes narrow scope with respect to a higher, here unpronounced, negation. 9 9 Coordination facts in German point to this conclusion as well. Inside PPs, as in (i), kein may appear, apparently licensed by reiterated unpronounced VP-adjoined nicht (putting paid to any putative analysis that would rely on adjacency for a supposed nicht+ein → kein conversion): This is obviously related to the phenomenon of negative concord more generally (see Giannakidou 2006 and Penka 2011) , such as uses of no in non-standard English varieties such as the following (though negative concord items are quite variable across languages, and I by no means mean to suggest that all these items will have a similar distribution; see Tubau 2008 for discussion).
(31) They ain't got no fever.
A similar conclusion is reached by Potts 2000 Potts , 2002 Positing that these do not involve coordinated PPs, but rather involve coordinated VPs-or ΣPs, in one implementation-, the second two of which have unpronounced negations, seems to be the only way to make sense of the fact that the conjunction und 'and' is used, not oder 'or': if the one overt nicht 'not' were adjoined and taking scope over all three PPs (or indeed VPs), we'd expect oder, just as in English. (And any scoping mechanism for the negative part of kein would have to answer why the Coordinate Structure Constraint isn 't violated.) e. (33) Alger did not do anything illegal, as Joe believed (the whole time / quite wrongly). a. As-clause = Joe believed the whole time that Alger did not do anything illegal b. As-clause = Joe believed wrongly that Alger did something illegal In the present system, these data can be taken to indicate that the controller for agreement that results in the determiner no being pronounced is featurally distinct from that which triggers any. Just as in Klima's system, we must distinguish these two: in the standard variety of English, these largely correspond to whether there is an overt correlate of the Neg head in the clause: when not/n't appears, we have any, and when the covert negation appears, we have no. One feature specification that would result in the correct pattern is the following, adopting Klima' It would also be possible to make the relevant distinction directly dependent on the presence of the overt sentential negator, by making this negator itself control a feature on the Neg Σ; if valued by not, the resulting Σ would then pass on the relevant value to D, yielding any, for example (see Giannakidou 2007 and Penka 2011 for accounts of concord phenomena that exhibit such patterns).
But one must be careful, however, not to link the presence of the Σ[Pol:Neg] too directly to the presence of not, since any is found in a range of contexts that lack not: a wider range of nonveridical contexts (see Giannakidou 2011 for an overview). Recall that Σ[Pol:Neg] itself should be posited to occur in clauses with the relevant semantic property: Σ[Pol:Neg] itself does not contribute negation (not does, in those sentences that have it). So for instance, Σ[Pol:Neg] in English appears in questions, if -clauses, and more, while in other languages it may appear also in imperatives, disjunctions, etc. Let there be no mistake: the label 'Neg' for the feature value is purely for convenience; it may be helpful to call it '57' instead, where the mnemonic connection to negation is broken, and the idea that its distribution can vary across languages and constructions is more easily understood. With this very important nomenclatural caveat in mind, I will nonetheless continue to use 'Neg'.
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Apparent scope splits leading to converse understandings can be found under ellipsis with few as well:
(36) John has few friends, and frankly, his brother doesn't really, either. <have many N P I friends> This fact is not unexpected, given the observations relating to few in McCawley 1993 , Johnson 2000a , 2000b , and Lin 2002 In nonstandard varieties of English that have a concord no (in e.g., It ain't no reason to cry), I suspect that the concord no is in complementary distribution with any (yielding *It ain't any reason to cry, with my hypothetical judgment indicated). These dialects do, as far as I know, also have any, but only in nonconcord uses: Ifn anybody calls, I ain't home, where no is banned: #Ifn nobody calls, I ain't home. These dialects would therefore have the character of polarity/negativeconcord items in Slavic, exhibiting the well-known 'bagel'-distribution (see Pereltsvaig 2004 ).
(37) a. Few dogs eat Whiskas or cats Alpo.
b. Carrie was a fat, not very interesting cat, kept mainly for mousing purposes, and the children ordinarily paid little attention to her, or she to them. [Edward Eager, Half Magic, Harcourt, New York, 1954, pp. 30-31] There are again the same two analytical possibilities available to us here to account for the separation of the apparently determiner-contributed quantification from the restriction: either the polarity item scopes out and the rest gets interpreted under existential closure, or the determiner combines with the restriction outside the ellipsis site (as on Johnson's and Lin's proposals). In this latter case, the resulting LF is as follows for the examples in (37): 11 11 Additional constraints will have to account for the detailed distribution of split readings with few and little, as they seem not to occur in object position when interacting with a subject, yet do persist in ditransitives, an issue I'll leave aside here:
(i) a. *Some will eat few Brussels sprouts or others <will eat few> lima beans. b. I'll give few Brussels sprouts to Mary or lima beans to Max. The idea that apparently semantically potent bits of morphology may be in some case be idle (though not always) finds support also from the observations regarding dependent plurals made by Sag 1976:143-150 . He points out that dependent plurals license singular deletions, and vice versa, as in (40) and (41) 12 , while inherent plurals do not (shown in (42)).
(40) a. John's uncles are bachelors, but Betsy claims her uncle isn't. <a bachelor> b. The women gave lectures at museums, and Sam volunteered to, also.
<give a lecture at a museum> (41) Betsy's uncle is a bachelor, and mine are, too. <bachelors> (42) John has living parents, and Bill does, too. =<have living parents>, =<have a living parent>
In sum, while morphology is often a good indicator of meaning, a strict adherence to surface lexicalism would make it difficult to account for this range of data.
Questions of position and locality
Further questions arise concerning the exact position of negation. For present purposes, it will suffice to note that larger ellipses (namely sluicing and fragment answers, which target higher nodes than does VP-ellipsis) don't allow us to 'ignore' negation.
13 That is, no ambiguities are found, and a negation in an antecendent clause will always require a corresponding negation in the elided clause:
(43) Sluices a. A number of senators have told me privately that they can't support the amendment, but I'm not at liberty to reveal which ones. b. Bush didn't invite several senators to his prayer breakfast; the White
House press office has a list of which. c. Lately, Mark hasn't been able to play the sonata flawlessly. I don't know why. i. = why Mark hasn't been able to play the sonata flawlessly ii. = why Mark has been able to play the sonata flawlessly d. Abby didn't turn off the stove, but I don't know when.
i. = when she didn't turn off the stove ii. = when she turned off the stove e. Few senators support one of the lobbyists' balanced budget amendmentsfind out whose! i. = whose (balanced budget amendment) few senators support These examples are unambiguous, as one would expect if, as standard analyses posit, they involve targeting a larger structural domain-a clausal one which will necessarily include negation. Therefore, no split readings will be found: the negation is contributed by a clause-internal head, and this head is necessarily dominated by the phrase elided.
Another question that emerges on this approach concerns locality: how local must the valuer be to the valued feature? This is a much larger question than can be answered determinatively here (the large literature on agreement addresses the complexities involved directly), but we can note that the relevant judgments seem to point in the direction of some constraints on locality.
(45) Abby didn't want to eat anything, but Ben did. <want to eat something> (46) ?Abby didn't say she'd ever been to Uruguay, but Ben did <say he'd been at least once to Uruguay>.
(47) ??Abby didn't say Sheila had ever been to Uruguay, but Ben did <say Sheila had been at least once to Uruguay>.
(48) ?Mark would never read a book that contained a single heretical word, but Ben would, and did, that damn atheist.
(49) Abby believed the claim that no-one came to the party, but Ben didn't. = <believe the claim that someone came to the party> These track scopal possibilities to some extent (a poorly understood domain; see Szabolcsi 2010) , and, more clearly, islands, as certain kinds of polarity licensing does as well, as Ross 1967:170, 249-259 pointed out: (50) a. Do you believe (*the claim) that anybody was looking for anything?
b. *I never met that man who anybody tried to kill.
Ross proposed a general condition (Ross 1967:248 (6.193) ) as follows:
(51) All feature-changing rules obey the same constraints as chopping rules [namely, islands -JM] .
He also noted exceptions, in which downward cascade or iterative licensing (or valuing) is possible :
(52) a. I can't remember the name of {anybody|*somebody} who had any misgivings. (Ross 1967:249-250) b . Everybody who has ever worked in any office which contained any typewriter which had ever been used to type any letters which had to be signed by any administrator who ever worked in any department like mine will know what I mean.
While such examples are problematic-or at least require additional discussionunder purely semantic scope theories of polarity licensing, they fall into place in the current account as being part of the larger investigation into locality conditions between controllers of agreement and their targets (while no means a trivial question, at least one that has many lines of research addressing it; see Wurmbrand 2011 for a recent overview).
Another potential advantage of taking the some/any alternation to be regulated by syntactic agreement is that we may be able to begin to capture the puzzling but well-known c-command requirement that is taken to hold (typically at S-structure, but see Uribe-Echevarria 1994 for some justly famous counterexamples). On the present account, this falls out as a consequence if certain agreement relationsincluding the present one, crucially-only obtain if the controller of agreement c-commands the target of agreement.
As a reviewer notes, the fact that it is possible to license any across certain finite clause boundaries may be problematic for standard theories of agreement, which typically take the clause, or the CP, to be the domain of agreement. The fact of the matter is, however, that the full range of agreement types and the conditions on them is not well understood. Well-documented cases of cross-clausal agreement do exist: Tsez and Innu-Aimun, for instance, are argued in Polinsky and Potsdam 2001 and Branigan and Mackenzie 2002 respectively, to have true agreement into embedded clauses. If the current approach to polarity items is on track, these elements show that we need to allow such agreement in English as well, at least for certain kinds of targets of agreement.
Minimizers and complex polarity items
Finally, we should consider the behavior of minimizers under ellipsis. They are found here, but the issues they raise are different: minimizers are not ungrammatical in such contexts-instead, they receive their 'minimal' interpretation; we have access to the literal (or nonidiomatic) meaning, just as with idioms (Horn 1989:400) .
(53) a. John didn't sleep a wink, but Mary did. (=sleep at least a minimal amount) b. John wouldn't budge an inch, but Mary did. (= move at least a minimal amount) c. John didn't lift a finger that day, but Mary did. (=do at least a minimal amount) d. Mark didn't bat an eye|move a muscle when they told them they were fired, but Susan certainly did-in fact, she fell off her chair in surprise! e. John didn't say a word, but Mary did. In fact, she said a lot of words/them! f. A: John spilled the beans. B: Really? Was he able to find them all again?
(54) a. John didn't sleep a wink, but Mary did <sleep a wink>. b. Mark didn't bat an eye|move a muscle when they told them they were fired, but Susan certainly did <bat an eye|move a muscle>-in fact, she fell off her chair in surprise! (55) a. John didn't sleep a wink, but Mary did sleep a wink-in fact, she slept all morning! b. Mark didn't bat an eye|move a muscle when they told them they were fired, but Susan certainly did bat an eye|move a muscle-in fact, she fell off her chair in surprise! In certain ('echoic') contexts, minimizers differ from NPIs like anyone, at all:
(56) Q: Did John lift a finger? A: Yes, he lifted a finger. (='he did at least a minimal amount') In fact, he helped a lot.
(57) Q: Did you eat anything/ at all this morning? A: *Yes, I ate anything/ at all this morning.
So the nature of the 'problem' with minimizers in ellipsis contexts is different: its solution is the solution we give to the well-formedness of dialogues like (55) and (56).
In fact, one sometimes finds these minimizers in nonlicensed environments, showing exactly their 'minimal' meanings:
(58) Mr. Obama "budged" on Iran before he was ever elected. The current approach also requires that what appear to be multi-word sequences that are thought to be polarity sensitive be in fact elements that can be targeted for lexical insertion, just as for phrasal idioms. In particular, Dutch items such as ook maar één (lit. 'also only one', with a distribution similar to any; see e.g., Hoeksema 2002), brought to my attention by a reviewer, will have to have their polarity sensitivity encoded as a phrase. Though the nature of such phrasal items (or 'partikelgroepjes' in Hoeksema's phrase) is not entirely clear, there are certainly approaches that take these to be a single whole for the purposes of polarity licensing, and do not attempt to decompose them (cf. German polarity item auch nur, lit. 'also only', and Giannakidou 2011 for discussion).
Conclusion
My goal here has not been to defend the protasis of the conditional-that a syntactic identity condition for ellipsis exists-but rather simply to explore the nature of the apodosis. We have been led to posit a quite abstract analysis for polarity items, with the consequence that surface properties of more items than we thought are determined by their syntactic relations to other elements in the structure.
Depending on one's theoretical predispositions, the analysis presented here will either count as a fascinating discovery about the nature of the syntax of polarity items (and potentially pronouns) or a reductio ad absurdum of the syntactic approach to the elliptical identity question. Et quamquam de gustibus sic est disputandum, hic locus non est.
Appendix: Triggering ellipsis: The [E] feature
In this appendix, I present a formal version of the identity requirement on ellipsis alluded to in the body of the paper, implemented by an E-feature. (For development and discussion of the E-feature, see Merchant 2001 , van Craenenbroeck and Lipták 2006 , Vicente 2006 , Corver and van Koppen 2007 , 2009 , Ha 2007 , Toosarvandani 2008 , Aelbrecht 2009 , van Craenenbroeck and Lipták 2010 Recall the voice mismatch asymmetry, and note that focussed elements can be disregarded as well: (59) These latter facts were accounted for by a definition of e-GIVENness that abstracted over focussed elements and their correlates in calculating identity: 
